THE DAILY EXCEPTION » Middle East & Africa

Is Israel losing bipartisan support?

Manish Thakur — Wed, 21 Sep 2011 14:39:30 +0000

As Israel ponders a new isolation in its neighborhood (one where it was never really accepted even at the best of times), I find myself wondering if there isn’t another long term trend that will threaten it even more profoundly. Its just a slight trend that I am noticing, but one that if played out, would spell enormous problems. And that is the rightward shift of some Jewish American groups towards the GOP and away from the Democratic Party. This is something that Jewish American groups must avoid at all costs – lest it cost Israel dearly.

Since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, US public opinion has swung firmly behind Israel. Supporting Israel has become an article of faith for both parties, responding as they are both to Jewish American activism and a strong Evangalical base whose support for Israel is unwavering. Bill Clinton once even said he would pick up a gun to defend Israel, a remarkable statement for a U.S. President to say about another country. People sometimes ask me why the U.S. support for Israel is so strong, and I answer that in many ways, Israel is a domestic issue more than a foreign policy one. Israel is us. Vast numbers of Americans, far beyond the Jewish community, identify with Israel (as they do with the English speaking world), and so an attack on Israel is seen as an attack on us – the geopolitics of the Middle East be damned.

Given this bipartisan support, the White House has almost reflexively backed whichever party was in power in Jerusalem, even when it didn’t agree with it. This support has allowed Israel to weather all sorts of international pressure. Time and again, the U.S. uses its veto to protect it in at the United Nations. Israel could feel comfortable that this support was forthcoming because it was so broad based. But what if Israel were to stop being an article of faith in Washington, and become a political football between the two parties?

As it is, Evangelicals almost exclusively back the Republican Party. For them, any sign of wavering by a Democratic President is an invitation for partisan attack. Traditionally, this hasn’t mattered as much as the Democratic Party itself (particularly in Congress) is full of staunch friends of Israel. In fact, Jewish American groups have traditionally been more liberal leaning than conservative. With the rise of the neo-conservatives, however, this is changing. More and more, vocal supporters of Israel are identifying with the Republican Party, and are using charges of lack of support for Israel to attack the Democratic Party. At the same time, I am beginning to see some liberal Jews far more circumspect in their support for Israel than their parents’ generation. What we are witnessing therefore is a situation where unconditional support for Israel could conceivably become consolidated in the Republican Party, and weaken in the Democratic Party. What was once an article of faith for both parties could become yet another issue that divides the parties.

When an issue stops being bipartisan and becomes a part of the party wars, our ability to consistently speak as one voice is severely hampered. In a world where support for Israel increasingly is seen by Americans as a Republican issue, a future Democratic President may feel far less kinship with Israel than he or she would today. Unflinching support for Israel would then be dependent upon who was in the White House and what the composition of Congress was. Have no doubt, the Democratic Party isn’t about to abandon its historic support for Israel, but it may become far more conditional on who is in power in Jerusalem and what policies it pursues. This, in fact, has already begun to happen. Take this to its logical conclusion, and Israel may find its days of unwavering U.S. support a thing of the past.

Filed under: 2012 Candidates on Defense & Security, Middle East & Africa, United States Tagged: bipartisan, Israel, Jewish American

Has Israel reached the peak of its geopolitical power

Manish Thakur — Tue, 13 Sep 2011 15:10:14 +0000

For all its problems with its neighbors, Israel entered this year with relative security on its once-volatile borders. Its southern front with Egypt was quiet, and it enjoyed peace – if a cold one – with that important Arab nation. It also had a peace treaty on its Eastern borders with Jordan too. In the North, Hizbollah was a threat, but a manageable one, especially since the Hariri regime in Lebanon was not interested in war. Moreover, Syria, the regional heavyweight in Lebanon, also had no stomach for conflict with Israel. The Palestinians, for all the problems, were committed to the Oslo peace accords, and so while things were stalled (much because of Jerusalem’s own intransigence), global pressure on the Jewish state was muted. Further afield, Israel enjoyed strong relations with Turkey, and US influence elsewhere in the Middle East kept other Arab governments off its back. In fact, the only real problem it faced was Ahmedinejad’s Iran, and even there American support was reassuring.

What a difference a year can make. Virtually of all of Israel’s geopolitical certainties have been washed away, to be replaced with something far more ominous. Three key factors account for this.

Most visibly, Israel’s relations with Turkey have fallen off a cliff. While Gaza may have been the spark, it seems that Ankara has made a decision to switch course in the Arab World, and there is little Israel can do to reverse that. The long term implication of this is as unclear. Turkey has a historic role as the leader of the Islamic World. Any move to reclaim this position makes Ankara’s view of Israel far more critical than before. At this point, it seems that Erdogan has decided to use Israel as the rallying cry to garner support in the Arab Street (as can be seen by the welcome he enjoyed in Cairo).

Secondly, the Arab Spring, which has unleashed popular anti-Zionist passions, is another cause for concern for Israel. The overthrow of Egypt’s pro-US Mubarak regime has made Israel’s peace with that country increasingly tenuous. While Cairo’s military government maintains that its peace agreement with Israel still stands, events on the ground (whether at the Israeli embassy in Cairo or in the Sinai) suggest otherwise. It is a very real possibility that Egypt will follow Turkey in downgrading ties with Israel. On its own this is a major problem. Add in turmoil in Syria, and you have the potential for a security crisis for Israel. If the Assad regime falls, there is every likelihood that it will be replaced by a more hostile Sunni regime, possibly Islamist.

Underlying the above two factors, is perhaps the biggest long term cause of concern for Israel, and that is the relative strength of its biggest benefactor, the United States. As our own power in the region slips, Arab governments feel less need to make nice with the Jewish state. This can most noticeably be seen with the Palestinian decision to take recognition of its statehood to the UN. The Saudis, with whom we have enjoyed a special relationship since 1945, are making noises that they will downgrade relations with Washington if the US vetoes Palestinian statehood. This is something that would have been unthinkable a few years back. If there is another intifada (a very real possibility), a lack of US influence in Arab capitals will only add to Israel’s woes.

On virtually every count, Israel will end this year in a vastly weaker geopolitical position than when it entered it. I have always maintained that Israel should make peace from strength. That position of strength has now passed. If Israel were to sit down with the Arabs today, I suspect they will find an opponent far more intransigent. This is a lost opportunity for Israel, one that I fear may not come back. Furthermore, heightened Israel-Arab tensions threaten our own standing in the Islamic World. Unflinching support for Israel (which is likely in an election year) will cost us far more dearly than only a year ago. It is going to take some deft diplomacy by Washington and some degree of flexibility by our Israeli ally to navigate these increasingly treacherous waters.

Filed under: Middle East & Africa Tagged: Arab Spring, Assad, Erdogan, Gaza, Intifada, Israel, Palestinian statehood, Saudi Arabia, Syria

Hard Headed Liberal Foreign Policy

Manish Thakur — Sun, 28 Aug 2011 09:52:26 +0000

I am not in the habit of calling myself a liberal. I prefer to describe myself a defense hawk. But i am impassioned in the defense of the idea that Democrats can be tough on national security and foreign policy. I wrote a few days back about President Obama’s tough “leading from behind”. His approach achieved our national priorities, yet it was also in line with the reality of our current resources. Furthermore, we did not need more international controversy. Rather we needed our allies to stand up. There was a great article in the Daily Beast which covered this more eloquently than me. I include it below, along with a link.

Obama as Hardheaded Liberal

Aug 26, 2011 8:02 PM EDT

The president was accused of neglecting alliances and ceding too much ground to allies in Libya, but this week’s successes in Tripoli prove he’s heir to Roosevelt and Truman.

Critics of President Obama are always banging on about his commitment to America’s alliance system. Yet the success of the NATO operation in Libya is the latest evidence of the effectiveness of his alliance approach.

It is true that during his campaign for president, Obama de-emphasized the role of alliances. He did not always draw bright lines between allies and other states. Instead he bracketed alliances with other, less intimate relationships, writing of his intention to rebuild “alliances, partnerships and institutions.” As the first president to come of age politically after the end of the Cold War, Obama did not seem to view alliances as special.

Republican provocateur John Bolton even claimed that Obama had “a post-alliance policy.”

However, President Obama has turned out to be much more alliance-friendly than candidate Obama. The “special relationship” with Britain has cooled somewhat, and he has reached out to new powers such as Indonesia. Yet despite the attacks of his critics, Obama’s approach to alliances sits squarely in the tradition established by his predecessors Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman.

Conservative commentators have mocked Obama’s belief in the efficacy of international rules. Obama wrote in The Audacity of Hope that “nobody benefits more than we do from the observance of the international ‘rules of the road.’” Many of these rules were established by Roosevelt and Truman, who believed that a rule-based system amplified U.S. power rather than constraining it. And it was the propensity of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia to break international rules and agreements that hardened those two presidents’ determination to contain and defeat them.

.In the Middle East, Obama has been criticized for walking away from America’s long-term friend President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, a step that worried officials in countries from Saudi Arabia to Israel. In fact, Obama’s response to the Arab Spring, though initially uncertain and clumsy, came to be characterized by a blend of caution and hardheaded liberalism. He now places a lesser premium than most of his recent predecessors did on the stability provided by Middle East allies, and a greater premium on their people’s right to democracy. But some of those allies can no longer provide stability anyway.

In the Egypt case, Obama is said to be insufficiently committed to allies. In the Libyan case, the opposite charge is leveled: that he ceded too much ground to allies, by allowing Britain, France, and other NATO allies to take the lead. Yet it would have been risky for the United States to lead another major military operation in the Middle East when it is already fighting two bloody wars nearby. It is especially galling when former officials of the Bush administration, which mismanaged the Afghanistan War, initiated the wrong-headed Iraq War, and blew out the Federal budget, refuse to acknowledge their own responsibility for the constraints that have limited America’s role in the Libya operation.

Viewing Libya another way, Obama has revived an old American tradition—exemplified by FDR’s foreign policy in the early stages of World War II—of using European allies as proxies to wage war when the United States is unable to take the leading position.

Events this week indicate that Obama’s approach in Libya has managed to cripple the Gaddafi regime in a way that maximizes the Libyan people’s ownership of the victory and minimizes the risks and costs to the United States. The contrast with George W. Bush’s approach in Iraq is stunning.

Obama’s Libya approach has managed to cripple the regime in a way that maximizes Libyan ownership of the victory and minimizes risks and costs to the U.S. The contrast with Bush’s Iraq approach is stunning.

Obama’s critics also fail to acknowledge that he is much more popular with allied publics than was his predecessor. This has not translated into greater assistance for the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan. On the other hand, it has restored drooping public support in allied countries for the idea of allying with Washington. For example, the number of Australians who believe the U.S. alliance is very important to their country’s security has shot up by 23 percent since the nadir of the Bush administration.

Of course, the biggest challenge to America’s position in the world comes not from the Middle East but from East Asia. And there, the president’s approach to China, and his commitment to America’s Asian allies, has strengthened significantly over his first term.

Initially Obama set out to accommodate Beijing’s interests and its claims. Yet the Chinese leadership failed to clasp his outstretched hand, disappointing the world at Copenhagen, failing to rein in its North Korean ally, and throwing its weight around in the region. Obama responded in kind, pushing back against the Chinese, taking two major trips to Asia, with significant stopovers in Tokyo and Seoul, and moving to deepen further America’s defense ties with Australia.

Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, the founders of America’s alliance system, were hardheaded liberals. They would certainly recognize Barack Obama as their heir.

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Michael Fullilove is the director of the global issues program at the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia and a nonresident senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. A lawyer and historian by training, he was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford and served as an adviser to the Australian prime minister. Fullilove’s next book, on the Second World War, will be published by The Penguin Press. You can follow him on Twitter at http://twitter.com/mfullilove.

Steven Casey is a reader in international history at the London School of Economics.

http://thebea.st

Filed under: 2012 Candidates on Defense & Security, Asian NATO, Middle East & Africa, NATO, United States Tagged: FDR, Foreign policy, liberal, Truman

Unlike Libya, regime change in Syria would have security implications for the U.S

Manish Thakur — Sat, 27 Aug 2011 13:46:23 +0000

This week’s regime change in Libya is a welcome development. The Libyan people can look forward to a much brighter future, even if the short or medium term may be messy, or even mildly Islamist. Lets not forget that the former dictator was an out and out terrorist who made Libya a pariah nation. Gadhafi was behind Lockberie, and provided support to terror groups from Palestine to Ireland. He became such a thorn in the side of the West that Ronald Reagan ordered air raids against his Tripoli home, killing his adopted daughter. In some ways, Gadhafi never changed. In recent years, he made common cause with Hugo Chavez, our own hemisphere’s rogue. But this alliance was probably more annoying than anything else. (Given Chavez’ determination to cause problems for the U.S., nothing should be taken for granted.) For all of this though, Gadhafi had in fact reached an uneasy coexistence with the West in recent years. He had given up his WMD program, and begun a domestic modernization program. Gadhafi may have been a bad man, but was no longer an immediate threat to the West. Though overthrow may be a compelling story, it will have little impact on U.S. security (with the possible side-effect of missiles falling in the hands of Al Qaeda or other groups).

Syria is, however, quite a different story. Its dictatorship may be just as bad as Libya’s (even if Hafez Assad, was initially seen as something of a reformer), but its geopolitical role is quite different. It is involved in virtually every trouble spot of note in the Middle East. It is in direct conflict with Israel. It is an indispensable player in Lebanon, backing Hizbollah, its divisive and destructive terrorist group/government. It borders Iraq, and has the potential to cause us problems there. It is, however, its relationship with Iran that should really make us sit up. Syria is a largely Sunni country, but run by Alawites – a small sect closer to the Shia Islam of Iran. It serves as Iran’s beachhead into the Arab World, aiding its climb to regional power status, something that we inadvertently made possible by removing Saddam Hussein, its traditional rival. United States foreign policy experts are clear that Iran poses a direct threat to our allies in Europe and Israel. Indeed our anti ballistic missile program is specifically aimed at defending from Iranian attacks. As importantly, Iran is a threat to our Sunni Arab allies in the Gulf, seeking to eclipse Saudi leadership, even “liberating” US allies such as Bahrain, a Shia-majority country ruled by Sunnis, and home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The competition between the Sunni Gulf headed by Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran is perhaps the most dangerous fault line in the region. Fallout from it could impact oil supplies so critical to the world economy.

Iran poses a real threat to our allies in Europe, Israel and the Sunni-dominated Gulf. Syria plays a key role in its grand strategy to become the dominant regional power. What happens in Syria is therefore of direct consequence to us. We may not be intervening in Syria, militarily, the way we did in Libya, but we should be far more concerned.

Filed under: Middle East & Africa, United States Tagged: Arab Spring, Assad, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Shia, Sunni, Syria

Sometimes leading from behind is the right thing to do

Manish Thakur — Fri, 26 Aug 2011 13:48:21 +0000

A number of U.S. politicians and defense specialists, John McCain included, have criticized the President for not taking an active public role in leading NATO action in Libya – for leading from behind. Such criticism, however, is based on cynical domestic politics, and not on well thought through international policies.

The United States is already fighting two open wars in the Islamic World, and waging a number of other battles from Pakistan to Yemen. As a result, we are seen as an intrusive, hostile force by Arab and Muslim people, no matter what our intentions. Loudly leading another front would only add to this rage, and undermine our interests. Furthermore, the American people themselves have no appetite for another land war in a Muslim country, especially a war that will be seen as one of choice. Rallying the American people for war – leading from the front – the way George W Bush did in Iraq would have been hugely unpopular.

In the Arab world, change is coming, whether we lead from the front, back, or not at all. The populations in the region’s autocracies and monarchies are getting younger, better informed and angrier. An explosion, driven by domestic unrest, was inevitable. The ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia had nothing to do with us whatsoever. Similarly, Egypt’s revolution was led by the students in Tahrir Square, though the removal of U.S. support was the critical turning point in Mubarak’s decision in stepping down. The uprising in Libya also started as a purely domestic affair. It was only Gadhafi’s threat of massacring the people of Masrata that moved us to seek UN authorization for Western intervention.

It is clear now that NATO’s intentions went far beyond the humanitarian action authorized by the UN. London and Paris, it seems, decided that it was in their interests to see the end of the Gadhafi’s government, and so sought an old fashioned regime change. Whether this was a smart move or not, time will tell, but openly announcing this intention to remove another Arab government would have outraged the Arab World and denied the Libyan rebels the legitimacy they needed with their own people. From an American perspective, rallying the American people to take the lead in an attack on a country not threatening us, would have been counterproductive, particularly as this was clearly something being sought by Europe, and not us. As it was Congress was unhappy with the way the U.S. got involved. Ultimately, this was a British and French decision, and it was therefore there’s to lead. The continued relevance of NATO, in fact, demanded that the U.S. not be seen to be carrying the entire burden of Western defense. No doubt, US military support was indispensable, and it was provided – just without fanfare or primetime noise.

In the end analysis, we can only judge the effectiveness of a policy by reviewing its results. As NATO operations wind down, these are now plain to see. Massacres were avoided in Masrata. Regime change was effected in Tripoli. The Arab Street did not erupt in rage against the United States. The Europeans took the lead in their own defense, a U.S. foreign policy goal. NATO unity was maintained. And the U.S. public has largely stood behind NATO actions.

I therefore see no other conclusion that President Obama’s approach of leading from behind has been hugely successful.

Filed under: 2012 Candidates on Defense & Security, Europe, Middle East & Africa, NATO, United States Tagged: Arab Spring, Gadhafi, Libya, Tripoli